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THE DARK FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
THE COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION. By 
Alexander Somek.' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
Pp. xii + 291. $98.50 (cloth). 
Dennis Patterson 2 
Behind every silver lining there is a cloud.- Glenn Gould 
INTRODUCTION 
Alexander Somek has written two brilliant books about E. U. 
law. In Individualism, 3 he demonstrated how the E.U. stifles 
Europeans through intrusive regulation. The book is a sustained 
attack on the authority of bureaucrats to intervene in the lives of 
citizens. Through a trenchant analysis of E.U. smoking 
regulations, Somek demonstrates the stultifying effects of 
insufferable regulation by the State. The analysis is so compelling, 
one almost feels like lighting up a cigarette in one's office just to 
push back against the bureaucracy. 
To similar effect, in Engineering Equality, 4 Somek focuses his 
attention on E.U. anti-discrimination law. He has little positive to 
say about it. Not that he is not a good liberal: he supports anti-
discrimination. His problem is not with the goal of anti-
discrimination but with the fact that progressives are undermining 
their own normative aspirations. Through "deconstruction" of the 
1. Professor of Law, University of Vienna. 
2. Professor of Law and Chair in Legal Philosophy and Legal Theory, European 
University Institute, Florence; Board of Governors Professor of Law and Philosophy, 
Rutgers University, New Jersey, U.S.A.; Professor of Law and Chair in International 
Trade and Legal Philosophy, Swansea University, Wales, U.K. I wish to thank my 
colleagues in the E.U.I. Law Department for a stimulating discussion of a draft of this 
review. I am especially indebted to Hans Micklitz for extraordinarily helpful comments on 
a draft of this essay. Thanks also to Bosko Tripkovic, my superb research assistant. 
3. ALEXANDER SOMEK, INDIVIDUALISM: AN ESSAY ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (200X). 
4. ALEXANDER SOMEK, ENGINEERING EQUALITY: AN ESSAY ON EUROPEAN 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW (2011 ). 
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distinction between "direct" and "indirect" discrimination, 
Somek draws the conclusion that E.U. anti-discrirnination law is 
"normatively twisted."5 E.U. anti-discrimination law inverts the 
hierarchy between direct and indirect discrimination, thereby 
rendering analysis and application of the law a "hotbed of moral 
controversy."6 As a result, the field devolves into pseudo-
normativity, the goal of which is the creation of" a world inhabited 
by better people-and not ... a world where power differentials in 
the relation of capital and labour have been readjusted such as to 
approach evermore closely a sustainable equilibrium."7 
Now to his latest book, The Cosmopolitan Constitution. 
Regarding constitutionalism, Somek's thesis is that modern 
constitutionalism has evolved through three distinct epochs. In 
the first epoch, best exemplified by the American experience, 
constitutionalism is about the constraint of public power. 
Grounded in the sovereignty of a people, the constitution is the 
expression of their liberty. It is the "constituent power"!' of a free 
people that gives the constitution its legitimacy. 
After the Second World War, a different form of the modern 
constitution emerged. Now constitutional legitimacy flowed not 
from the people but from a commitment to the protection of 
human rights. The validity of a constitution thus became a 
function of the degree to which it passed muster in evaluation by 
a system of peer review among nations. 
This second iteration of constitutionalism set the stage for the 
emergence of the third epoch of constitutionalisn1, what Somek 
dubs "The Cosmopolitan Constitution" ("TCC"). There are two 
faces to TCC. The first is political. In addition to the protection of 
human rights, TCC combats discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. Further, TCC develops modalities for 1managing state 
interactions with authorities outside the state. Secondly, and more 
darkly, TCC cedes political authority to various transnational 
administrative entities. 9 What has developed, Somek contends, is 
a new form of constitutional authority: authority for an 
"administered world" (p. 242). 
5. /d. at 16. 
6. /d. at 17. 
7. /d. at 15. Just as in Individualism, Somck disparages moralists-especially 
academics and hurcaucrats-who want to make people "hcttcr." It is one of the most 
refreshing aspects of his style. 
X. For an excellent discussion of the history of this notion, sec Martin Loughlin, The 
Concept of Constituent Power, 13 ELJR. J. POL. THEORY 21X (2014). 
9. These include ICANN, ISO, the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank. 
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The story of an evolving constitutional order is the 
political/legal aspect of Somek's narrative but it is not the most 
important part of his argument. While the ostensible subject of 
TCC is constitutionalism, Somek's real target IS global 
capitalism. 10 Somek believes the global polity is being 
systematically subjugated to the will of a global financial elite. 
From the rise of transnational governance to the withering effects 
of the Troika, democratic participation is inexorably being 
crushed by the interests of global capital. Today, "peoples are 
dominated by core institutions of modern capitalism" (p. 238). 
Finance (i.e., the interests of global capital) has displaced "the 
people." The only way out, Somek avers, is "political action" (p. 
283). 11 
There is much one might focus on in a review of this rich and 
engaging book. Everything from the details of each constitutional 
epoch, the rise of transnational regulation, the intricacies of E.U. 
law, to the general topic of global constitutionalism deserve 
attention. Somek's writing is provocative, stylistically engaging, 
and well-informed. After providing an overview of the argument 
of the book, I will concentrate on Somek's most wide-ranging 
claim, mentioned above: viz., the current epoch of modern 
constitutionalism is firmly in the grip of global capitalism. 
NATION-STATE AND CONSTITUTION 
When one hears "The Cosmopolitan Constitution," the 
temptation might be to think the phrase is similar to, if not 
synonymous with, "Global Constitutionalism." Nothing could be 
further from the truth. Global Constitutionalism- the idea of one 
law for the globe-is a seminar room fantasy. 12 The nation-state, 
which has been the centerpiece of the global order of states since 
10. Somek has posted a You Tube video in which he presents the main themes or the 
book. See University of Iowa Law Library, Somek on "The Cosmopolitan Constitution", 
YouTURE (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47NLz2K4zcX. The cover 
or the book features a painting by the Austro-Hungarian painter Adolf Hir6my-Hirschl, 
entitled "Souls on the Banks of the Acheron." (The painting hangs in the Belvedere 
Museum just outside the center of Vienna.) As Somek explains in the video, the painting 
shows "Hermes, the god or commerce [global capitalism I, leading the deceased [political[ 
souls into the underworld." He ends the video by asking the question whether '"our 
constitutional experience' has come to an end." If it has, he suggests, the culprit is "global 
international capitalism." 
11. Here Somek echoes themes similar to Hardt and Negri. See MICHAEL HARDT & 
ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000). Somek is silent on what forms of political action he has 
in mind. 
12. In The Cosmopolitan Constitution, Somek relentlessly skewers contemporary 
defenders of a global constitutional order. 
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the Peace of Westphalia, remains the focus of any effort to 
understand world order 13 and, more importantly, the evolution of 
constitutionalism at the global level. The nation-state is central to 
Samek's brief for TCC. 
As mentioned, Modern Constitutionalism has gone through 
three iterations. The first iteration of constitutionalism -Somek 
calls it "Constitutionalism 1.0" -is, as James Madison put it, "a 
charter[] of power[s] granted by liberty." 14 Liberty and power are 
of the essence of Constitutionalism 1.0. From the American 
perspective, which serves as the exemplar, sovereignty lies with 
the people. The constitution establishes limited, separated powers 
for government. In addition, judicial review subjects the executive 
and legislative branches of government to review of their 
respective exercises of power. When the executive or Congress 
chooses an end for the exercise of its power, "the relationship 
between the means chosen and the end pursued" (p. 7) receives 
judicial scrutiny. 
. ~onstitutionalism 1.0 is . no~ obs.olete, althou9,h the f?c~s 
shifts In the move from Constltutlonahsm 1.0 to 2.0. - The shift IS 
in the focus from power to rights. 16 Somek cites Germany's post-
World War II constitutional experience as the exemplar of the 
evolution to Constitutionalism 2.0. In the 2.0 world, a constitution 
springs not from a sovereign people but frorn "an act of 
reasonable recognition concerning the suprerne value and 
authority of human dignity and human rights" (p. 9). 
Constitutionalism 1.0 was about voluntary realization of the 
values of a people. 2.0 abandons voluntarism and embraces "the 
universal values of freedom, equality, and solidarity" (p. 9). The 
shift is from liberty to dignity. 
Somek provides a wealth of detail in his incisive descriptions 
of each constitutional epoch. It is in these details that the reader 
sees a foreshadowing of the dark side of Constitutionalism 3.0. 
Constitutionalism 1.0 was a project of emancipation, best 
represented by the French Revolution and the American 
colonialists' revolt against Britain. The raison d'etre of this form 
of constitutional ism is overcoming the externalities of status and 
privilege. 
13. See, e.g., HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER (2014). 
14. James Madison, Charters, NATIONAL GAZETrE (Jan. 19, 1792). 
15. As Somek explains, each iteration of constitutionalism is recallihrated as we move 
from one epoch to another (p. 9). 
16. See Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism 6---9 (UCL School of Puhlic 
Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 26, 2007). 
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Somek characterizes Constitutionalism 1.0 as "bourgeois" (p. 
11 ). The downside of Constitutionalism 1.0 is that it locates its 
subjects "within a market society largely immune from state 
interference" (p. 11 ). 17 Somek does not like this setup. In one of 
several gifted, bespoke examples that appear throughout the 
book, he says this about life in a market society: 
Decentralized human cooperation in markets, however, works 
by virtue of unintended man-made necessity. If all surrounding 
barbershops offer complementary coffee, my shop has to offer 
it too. This necessity is "external" in the sense that the 
opportunities to which it gives rise do not reflect what one 
wants by virtue of who or what one takes oneself to be. There 
is no way of living off exploring the contraction of God at the 
moment of creation if all that people want is lean food and 
inexpensive mobile phone plans. Likewise, if others work for 
less, one has the choice of working for less oneself. If 
competitors innovate, one has the choice to innovate first. A 
competitive life is spent engaging in pre-emptive strikes. If one 
does not choose what one must choose, one will go under. The 
choice is the choice of necessity, objectively and subjectively 
considered. It is the choice of and by necessity (p. 11 ). 
Freedom in this form of social order is "formal"; so much so that 
"it is even indifferent to its own choosing" (p. 11 ). 
Constitutionalism 2.0 takes a different approach to human 
freedom. Here negative liberty is still endorsed but it does so 
"through the pooling of risks" (p. 11 ). The aspiration of a society 
of dignity is freedom from economic necessity. Where peoples' 
choices "are driven by their needs and their fear of losing their 
livelihood" (p. 12), they are not really "free." Constitutionalism 
2.0 is all about rising above the buffeting effects "of our nature" 
(p. 13) as we try to free ourselves from the "potentially enslaving 
effects of bourgeois emancipation" (p. 13). It's all quite bleak. 
American constitutional practice is fixated on interpretation 
of the written text of its constitution. This practice is the key 
element of the judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation. By contrast, Constitutionalism 2.0 is grounded in the 
recognition of human rights. In this regard, the reflexive 
constitutional engagements revolve around proportionality. The 
questions are "whether government action has been too intrusive 
17. Throughout the hook, Somek makes clear his disdain hoth for capitalism and 
markets. He has no affection for ideas like "creative destruction" and there is no place for 
Adam Smith in his pantheon. 
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vis-a-vis fundamental rights or not sufficiently protective of them" 
(p. 17). 
Now Constitutionalism 3.0 starts to emerge. 1x 2.0 is based on 
recognition of human rights. But this presupposition occurs within 
the frame of a state with sovereign peoples. Curiously, human 
rights-which are supposed to be "superior" to sovereign 
authority- require that very same sovereign for their articulation 
and realization. The import of this relationship cannot be 
overstated. Samek writes: 
This relationship of simultaneous superiority and dependence 
is of enormous import. First, it means that any institution 
wielding public authority needs to he as good as any other in 
the face of human rights. Second, whether the institution meets 
the relevant standard can only hy ascertained by heeding what 
peer institutions are doing. Human rights depend for their 
articulation and realization on public authority even though 
they also transcend any instantiation of it. The transcendence 
of particularity can he real only in horizontal self-relativization. 
There is no other way. Sovereignty serves human rights 
through its own abdication. Authority says: "I am one among 
others. In order to find out whether I live up to my standards, 
I will look around and sec what my peers arc doing" (p. 17). 
This is the European model of constitutionalism. Through 
the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European 
Court of Human Rights, transnational standards of rights 
protection are established outside the sovereign state with force 
and effect within the states' borders. This raises the obvious 
question of conflict between national and transnational standards, 
thereby engendering the challenge of pluralism which is dealt with 
by the doctrine of "margin of appreciation." 19 The doctrine, 
Samek maintains, 
is based on the idea that national authorities are better 
positioned to strike the balance between individual rights and 
the common good since they arc in "direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their countries." That the vital 
forces could be evil forces docs not enter the picture as long as 
the societies continue to be democratic (p. 19). 20 
I X. As discussed hclow, the dynamics arc largely a matter of economic integration. 
1Y. See, e.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 54Y3/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 
91914X-4Y (1Y7ft ), available at http://hudoc.echr.coc.int/sitcs/eng/pages/scarch.aspx'!i=OO I-
574YY. 
20. Citing 1/andyside, I Eur H.R. Rep. 914X. 
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Pluralism -competition among legal orders for control- is a 
hallmark of European constitutionalism. 21 The legal theoretical 
issue is one of legitimate authority. In a clash between legal 
orders, say the Court of Justice of the European Union and a 
national constitutional court, the question is who wins? The 
practice has been for national courts to enforce extra-national 
norms "so long as" the extra-national norm meets the minimal 
requirement of the national norm. 22 
The intercourse between legal orders raises the question of 
authority. Solange23 jurisprudence is accommodative and untidy. 
Somek disparages it as "the law of the jungle" (p. 21 ). He makes 
his point this way: 
In practice this means that in the course of pluralist interaction, 
all participants are able to exercise any power so long as they 
can effectively get away with it. While this smacks of the law of 
the jungle, it is obvious that the overall interaction between and 
among national or international or supranational sites is 
eventually embedded into political constraints. Owing to their 
existence, each participant realizes it would be imprudent or 
unwise to offend others. They realize that they had better 
respect what is important to others and grasp opportunities to 
avoid conflict by leaving matters undecided. Constitutionalism 
3.0 is, therefore, witness to the return of political 
constitutionalism. Effective constraints emerge not from law 
but from more or less subtle equilibria of power. In contrast to 
the legally grounded political constitutionalism envisaged by 
the system of checks and balances, this political 
constitutionalism is rather crude. The overall constitution of 
21. For discussion, sec KLEMEN JAKLIC, CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE E. lJ. 
(2013). 
22. Somck elahoratcs: 
Pluralism in the European Union has given rise to forms of (mutual) cmhcdding. 
One legal order pledges to yield to the norms and jurisdiction of another ·'so long 
as" its level of fundamental rights protection is sufficiently "equivalent'' to that 
of the yielding legal order. This is now cstahlishcd doctrine not only for C Ierman 
constitutional law vis-a-vis the European Court of .I usticc hut also for the 
European Human Rights law vis-a-vis the same court, and, most famously, for 
European Union law vis-a-vis the UN Security Council. The national legal orders 
and the European Convention System yields to E.U. law, the E.U. yields to the 
United Nations and, not least, the Convention system yields to the participating 
states "so long as" the requisite others stay within a margin of appreciation, 
however it may he actually defined. The system to which room is conceded, need 
not he identical, however, a sufficient similarity must he manifest in the long run 
(p. 196, citations omitted). 
23. "Solange" names important decisions of the German Constitutional Court 
regarding constitutional limits to the primacy of E.U. law. For discussion, sec PRINCIPLES 
OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 411-412 (Armin von Bogdandy & .I urgcn Bast cds., 
2009). 
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the multilevel system ceases to be law altogether. It is a factum, 
not a norm (p. 21, citations omitted). 
Somek has little positive to say about the present era's 
treatment of transnational legal phenomena. Having decided that 
Constitutionalism 3.0 is really "a form of political [as opposed to 
legal] constitutionalism" (p. 22), Somek bemoans the "erosion" of 
Constitutionalism 1.0. The erosion reaches from human rights to 
transnational law. He writes: 
That constitutionalism 3.0 Is a form of political 
constitutionalism can be observed also against the broader 
social context from which it emerges. It is a world in which the 
remains of constitutionalism 1.0 are increasingly subject to 
erosion. As a result, one arrives at a twofold picture. While the 
world of human rights protection is "pluralistic" owing to 
various forms of formal or informal peer review, the 
organizational part of constitutional law is permanently under 
siege by the exigencies of practical problem solving across 
national borders and various layers of an emerging multilevel 
system. 
The pressures of practical problem solving, which are most 
salient in combating terrorism or rescuing a common currency, 
affect the role of legislature, which took center place in the 
world of constitutionalism 1.0. Nowadays, societies exist under 
conditions of permanent social acceleration. Not least owing to 
the influence of mass media reporting, the public and politics 
are under the impression of being persistently seized by this or 
that crisis. Under these conditions, expeditious and effective 
problem solving becomes imperative. Authority is, therefore, 
systematically inclined to migrate toward transnational fora (or 
"networks") of executive governance. The new allocation of 
power is occasioned by the impression of necessity. The 
authority that is constituted de facto ceases to be based on a 
charter created by liberty. In its more disturbing instantiation, 
constitutionalism 3.0 is the constitutionalism of necessity (p. 22, 
citations omitted). 
Human rights protection, constitutional law, and even 
transnational fora are all evidence of a crisis in power which is 
expressed as a failure in authority that responds to the necessities 
of the moment. Gone are the days when there was clarity about 
constitutional authority (i.e., the era of Constitutionalism 1.0). 
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Now the exigencies of the moment have delivered power into the 
hands of the executive. 24 Again, Samek: 
Once repeated and expeditious problem solving becomes the 
categorical imperative of governance, the executive branch is 
likely to gain power at the expense of the legislature. Officially, 
the central role accorded to the legislature stays in place. 
However, in the face of the exigencies of interventions and the 
technicality of regulation, the legislature needs to cede ground 
to administrative processes. Legislative delegations and 
various avenues of oversight arc means to retain the superiority 
of the legislature at a symbolic level. But these arc, in fact, mere 
symbols. While delegation has long ceased to be convincing as 
a doctrine, oversight might not be terribly effective owing to a 
lack of capacity on the part of the legislature to monitor and 
apprehend even a fraction of what is done by the administrative 
branch. The very reasons that make delegation reasonable 
explain why oversight is blunt, in particular owing to the 
legislature's lack of information and expertise. 
The real world of constitutionalism 3.0 is the world of a 
perplexingly diffuse administrative state sans sovereignty 
juxtaposed with a multilevel system of fundamental rights 
protection. Old domestic authorities persist, not least because 
the national coercive apparatus is indispensiblc for purposes of 
implementation. It is more cost-effective than private 
enforcement or security services. Nevertheless, the center of 
gravity with regard to risk management and crisis intervention 
shifts to transnational governance structures. As the European 
sovereign debt crisis has revealed, formal legal constraints arc 
bent in order to accommodate necessities. Elections on the 
national level matter inasmuch as they add public acclaim to 
one or the other fait accompli. If the voters do not deliver 
"reasonable" results they are suspected of adhering to 
dangerous right-wing ideology (pp. 22-23, citations omitted). 
Not only is constitutionalism descending into the depths of 
political uncertainty, we are now witnessing the ever-growing 
threat of "authoritarian liberalism" (p. 23). We are approaching 
the dark side of Constitutionalism 3.0. 
The protections of Constitutionalism 1.0 erode in the 3.0 era. 
This is why Samek disparages 3.0 as the age of "'political 
constitutionalism." The cause of this breakdown is the direct 
24. This theme is well c.levelopec.l in the work of Saskia Sassen. See SASKIA SASSEN, 
TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGIITS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 
14X-271 (2006). 
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result of. the develoRment of condi.ti~ns of '.'permanent soci~l 
acceleration"(p. 22). · Among the victims of 1ncncased speed Is 
authority. Increased speed requires faster decisions and more 
effective problem solving than government can provide. Thus we 
witness the rise of transnational fora of executive governance. The 
effect is the production of an "administrative state sans 
sovereignty" (p. 23). What's really at the bottom of all of this: 
capitalism, of course. More on this below. 
As mentioned above, the Cosmopolitan Constitution has two 
faces. The political face of TCC begins with the understanding 
that, as cosmopolitans, we are at home anywhere in the world. 
Bounded democracies are paradoxical because they are as normal 
as they are morally defective. For a bounded democracy to be 
truly "cosmopolitan," the interests of "foreigners" must be 
represented. But how can people who are by definition 
"outsiders" be represented in a democracy? The answer, Somek 
avers, is "virtual representation." Virtual representation 
"requires adherence to human rights, democracy, the rule of law, 
and non-discrimination" (p. 245). 
The paradox of bounded democracy is "solved" by what 
Somek refers to as "the darling dogma of bourgeois 
Europeanists" (p. 253). Often cast as a matter of one state 
imposing externalities on another, Somek illustrates the doctrine 
with an example. If Spain decides to ban the importation of red 
wine because it has ill effects on labor productivity, that act will 
have a negative effect on the economy of Portugal. Enter the 
dogma: "it is undemocratic for bounded democracies to adopt 
decisions whose implementation affects citizens of other states 
without giving these citizens a voice" (p. 28). 
The dogma contains a paradox. If polities cannot regulate 
their own space, then democracy is stifled. Regulation is the 
legislative expression of democratic choice. But if that choice is 
hindered by restraint on the imposition of externalities on 
"foreigners," then democracy is stifled. The D1arling Dogma 
would thwart the work of democracy. 
Liberalism puts rights above the political process: rights are 
"trumps." The efficacy of the Darling Dogma requires a theory of 
(constitutional) rights that protects the claims of ''foreigners." 
Alas, the dogma "says nothing about the legitimacy of the 
25. Citing William E. Scheuermann, Citizenship and Speed, in HIGH-SPEED SOCIETY 
2X7-306 (Hartmut Rosa & William Scheuerman eds., 2009). 
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demands of others. It is substantially empty" (p. 29). The answer 
is the transnational and the administrative. 
The second face of Constitutionalism 3.0-its administrative 
face-is its dark side. Because the state is all about (economic) 
integration, and because the legislature has ceded its authority to 
the executive, the state simply "administers" in terms most 
favorable to the markets. It's the state against the markets and the 
markets are winning. Political life has been "diluted" by 
subservience to markets. It is the age of "Authoritarian 
Capitalism." This is the dark side of Constitutionalism 3.0. 
Samek identifies "administration" as the nefarious force 
suborned by Constitutionalism 3.0. It is through administrative 
rationality that the polity loses its democratic character. And, of 
course, administrative rationality is the handmaiden of global 
capitalism. As I said above, Samek argues that capitalism lies at 
the root of the demise of democracy. The administrators of 
modern nation-states26 have become unwitting objects of the force 
of global capital. Hence Samek's characterization of the present 
moment as one of "authoritarian liberalism." 
PLURALISM 
European constitutional law is preoccupied with pluralism in 
a way that tends to go unnoticed in the American context. Of 
course, this is due in large part to unique features of European 
Union law. From a technical point of view, the question is 
sometimes articulated from the perspective of legal orders or legal 
systems: just how many legal orders are there in Europe? 27 The 
second nexus for pluralist discussion is that of the transnational. 
The growth of transnational phenomena and the rise of 
transnational regulators are subjects of intense scholarly interest. 
Again, pluralism is a central feature of these discussions. 
There are both legal theoretical as well as political issues 
implicated in discussions of pluralism. Samek articulates 
pluralism as an issue in legal theory before discussing its place in 
Constitutionalism 3.0. His thesis is that contemporary 
conceptualizations of pluralism set the stage for the demise of law 
26. The rise of administrators as agents of nation-state policies is explored in ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
27. One of the hest treatments of the question from the point of view of legal theory 
is Julie Dickson, How Many Legal Systems?: Some Puzzles Regarding the Identity 
Conditions oj; and Relations Between, Legal Systems in the f.:uropean Union, 2 PROBLEMA 
lJ (200H). 
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and the rise of global capitalism. They do this by (unwittingly) 
replacing "legal constitutionalism" with "political 
constitutionalism." As Somek states, "Pluralism ... marks the 
point at which constitutional law comes to an end" (p. 197). 
The "gist" of pluralism, Somek argues, is to be found in the 
distinction between institutional pluralism and system pluralism 
(pp. 193-194). When a president and a court each assert their 
authority to interpret the constitution, this is an instance of 
institutional pluralism. The clash is internal in that each 
protagonist lays claim to the interpretive authority within the 
same legal order. 
When two legal orders claim ownership of a question or 
issue, we have an instance of systems pluralism. The clash is much 
deeper than that of the institutional context because each legal 
order is asserting its authority vis-a-vis the other. 2K A.s Somek puts 
it, the "norms belonging to different systems are irrelevant to one 
another" (p. 194). He provides an example: 
The now classical instance of system pluralism in the European 
Union is manifest in the assertion by the European Court of 
Justice that the European legal system is autonomous and 
hence independent of any external limitations determined by 
the constitutional laws of the Member States. This assertion is 
matched by Member States constitutional courts' claims that 
the authority of the European Union is derivative of the 
delegations made pursuant to national constitutions and can 
never go, within such constitutions, beyond constitutionally 
proscribed limits (p. 194, citations omitted). 
Somek treats the problem of clashing legal systems as 
fundamentally jurisprudential. He points out that the clash 
between competing legal systems "could only be resolved on the 
basis of one overarching system" (pp. 194-195). Given this 
structure, a third system is needed to manage the conflict and 
decide which system controls the question. Somek credits Hans 
Kelsen with this insight. Of course, Solange jurisprudence tries to 
2X. Somek cites and quotes the classic reference to the problem. It is the work of Neil 
MacCormick: 
Where there is a plurality of institutional normative order~. each with a 
functioning constitution (at least in the sense of a hody of higher-order norms 
establishing and conditioning relevant governmental powers), it is possihle that 
each acknowledge the legitimacy of every other within its own sphere, while none 
asserts or acknowledges constitutional superiority over another. In this case, 
'constitutional pluralism' prevails (p. 1YO n.YO, quoting NEIL MACCORMICK, 
QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMONWEALTH 104 (1 YYY)). 
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massage the situation through a careful dialectic of 
accommodation. 29 Somek will have none of this. 
Somek rejects institutional pluralism on grounds of legal 
theory. In addition, institutional pluralism paves the way for 
political constitutionalism. Here Somek draws a distinction 
between law and politics. The question is "what mediates mutual 
yielding and explains its legitimacy?" (p. 197). The answer to the 
legitimacy question is "nothing." As a consequence, 
"[p ]luralism ... marks the point at which constitutional law comes 
to an end" (p. 197). Pluralism is not "law'' but "the law of the 
jungle" (p. 198). It is "political" because "it comprises merely 
political processes whose patterns may actually reflect power 
differentials" (p. 197). 
Somek disparages the work of a variety of "apologists of 
pluralism" (p. 198), especially that of Mattias Kumm. Regrettably, 
Somek's disparagement depends on a distinction for which he 
provides absolutely no argument, between the "legal" and the 
"political." As he has done in previous work, 30 Somek invokes the 
authority of Hans Kelsen in drawing this all-important distinction. 
That is fine, as far as it goes, but citing Kelsen is not the same thing 
as providing an argument. And this Somek fails to do. Somek 
credits Kelsen's insight (described as "valid") that an overarching 
system is needed to break the deadlock between competing legal 
systems. 
2Y. Somck dcscrihcs the matter thus: 
Each system lays down the conditions under which it concedes authority to 
others. The others lsicllaws arc respected and applied even though they arc of 
foreign origin. This way of managing the pluralist situation is epitomized in the 
ingenious reply formulated in the so-called Solange I decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court. In this case, the Court had to address the claims made hy 
the Court of Justice of the European Union that Ell. law is autonomous and 
supreme. The thrust underlying these claims was, of course, that no national law, 
not even national constitutional law, could trump EU law. The Federal 
Constitutional Court replied calmly that while the autonomy and supremacy of 
the EU legal order could not he disputed, the scope within which Ell law can 
trump German law is to he determined pursuant to German constitutional law. 
Within the space allocated hy the German constitution to EU law it is allowed to 
reign supreme (p. 195, citations omitted). 
30. In an earlier article on Kclscn, Somck makes the same qucstion-hcgging move; 
that is, invoking Kdscn with no explanation of what he (i.e., Somck) means hy "law": 
The purveyors of legal pluralism, fragmentation and 'polycontcxturality' offer 
valuahlc insights; hut they should make explicit, too, that in speaking ahout a 
plurality of legal systems they produce an equivocation in the concept of legal 
validity. Legal validity may well he in demise. This should give the advocates of 
pluralism reason to acknowledge that what they arc talking ahout is no longer 
law. Alexander Somck, Kelsen Lives, 1 X EUR. J. INTERN'L LAw 409, 425 (2007) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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Somek condemns the "so long as" style of reasoning not only 
because he deems it "political," but because as such "[t]he people 
are lost" (p. 201 ). As he puts it, "Constitutionalism 3.0 admits 
bourgeois anarchism to constitutional law" (p. 200). Because 
courts are "entrusted with the task of protecting rights" (p. 201 ), 
it is paramount that they remain within the bounds of the law. 
Here we see the last remnants of Constitutionalism 1.0 snuffed 
out: 
In the context of constitutionalism 1.0, publicists explained the 
authority of the constitution by resorting to the idea of a social 
contract. The idea was that the constitution represents a mutual 
promise of citizens who thereby become members of a people 
or political society. They pledge to each other to respect 
constituted authority and to conduct themselves as members in 
good standing of their polity. The constitution is a norm that is 
shared by them. It lends unity to all relationships that citizens 
engage in (p. 200). 
Everything Somek says about constitutionalism depends on 
the distinction he draws between law and politics. There are two 
issues with Somek's reliance on this distinction. First is the 
question whether the distinction is precise enough to yield the 
consequences Somek desires. His position is based on the view of 
law as essentially apolitical, as something that is able to keep 
politics in check. 1 udith Shklar could have been describing 
Somek's views when she wrote in 1964: "Politics is regarded not 
only as something apart from law, but as inferior to law. Law aims 
at justice, while politics looks only to expediency. The former is 
neutral and objective, the latter the uncontrolled child of 
competing interests and ideologies." 31 But such views-Somek's 
included-do not appreciate an important nuance: when law 
attempts to constrain politics, it arguably becomes politicized. 32 
Treatment of pluralism as a jurisprudential phenomenon-and 
not as a wider political and societal condition -leads Somek to 
neglect the fact that law is likely to reflect and often amplify 
political differences rather than ameliorate the:m. The same 
process could be happening in the European Union, and 
31. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 111 
(llJ64). 
32. As Martin Loughlin puts it, "legalization of politics has led primarily to the 
politicization of law." MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 233 (2000). 
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jurisprudential clashes between courts could simply be a symptom 
of underlying political pluralism. 
This brings us to the second question: do we have reason to 
prefer legal over political solutions to the fact of pluralism? The 
resolution of this issue supervenes on Somek's ability to make a 
sharp distinction between law and politics, and his capacity to 
show that his idea of law is somehow preferable to politics. 
Constitutional pluralists take the opposite approach: they argue 
that l~ss crude forms ?f regll:lation and ,political en?agement are 
supenor to Somek's hierarchical model. - On such views, not only 
is the complete legalization of the constitutional domain in the 
European Union impossible, but it is also normatively 
problematic under the circumstances of disagreement and 
pluralism. There is also an important strand of theoretical 
thinking about constitutionalism that rejects its legalized form and 
recommends political constitutionalism as an alternative. 34 
Perhaps Somek would agree with them that the courts should not 
deprive people of their democratic political experience. But then 
his plea for a legal-hierarchical form of legitimation on European 
level is puzzling: he cannot have it both ways. 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Although transnational governance networks or institutions 
lack a public law pedigree, they are part of what Somek identifies 
as "a perplexingly diffuse administrative state sans sovereignty 
and a multilevel system of fundamental rights protection" (p. 
233). For the "legitimacy" of institutions such as ICANN,35 it is 
necessary that they be "rooted in some constitutional order" (p. 
229). But, Somek explains, transnational institutions are not 
legitimated through law, rather, their measure is "first and 
foremost in administrative accomplishment" (p. 229), that is, 
"effective management of administrative processes" (p. 229). 
Just as with constitutionalism, transnational governance is 
dismissed as "anarchical" (p. 230). Somek does not explain what 
33. See, e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND (Matcj Avhelj 
& Jan Komarek eds., 2012). 
34. See, e.g., RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A 
REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007); ADAM 
TOMKINS, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION (2005). 
35. ICANN is the non-profit California corporation responsible for the assignment 
of domain names on the internet. 
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would make transnational processes legitimate other than some 
connection to "law." More darkly, transnational institutions and 
processes are all part of the bleak edifice of Constitutionalism 3.0, 
the defining feature of which seems to be the "collapse" of 
Constitutionalism 1.0. In the course of things, "the people" are 
lost. They become "a counterfactual social fact" (p. 238). 
How have things gotten so bad? The answer is simple: 
capitalism. Somek explains: 
It has already become somewhat of a truism that nowadays 
peoples arc dominated by core institutions of modern 
capitalism. The reactions of economic agents, such as financial 
markets or rating agencies, arc of utmost importance to the 
design of economic and fiscal policies, while, at the same time, 
these agents do not bear any public responsibility. Financial 
markets have a neolibcral predilection for public austerity. 
Consequently, governments cooperating across national 
bounds need to ever more tightly contain grassroots resistance 
against retrenchment in order to implement from above what 
is good for a "healthy economy." Therewith emerges a new 
brand of authoritarian liberalism. Similar to its original form, it 
stands for economic governance that severs its dependence on 
the support of parliamentary democracy. It is subtler today, 
however, than it was in the 1930s. Members of the assembly are 
no longer simply sent home. They arc expected to bow to the 
reasonableness of pacts concluded between governments and 
financial institutions. (pp. 238-239). 
The bottom line is that in the era of Constitutionalism 3.0, 
governments have become hostages to global capital. 
Somek advances a fascinating narrative in support of his 
assertion of a deep connection between Constitutionalism 3.0 and 
global capitalism. Following the German sociologist Wolfgang 
Streeck,36 Somek's narrative begins after World War II. He 
describes the situation thus: 
If Strecck is right, the post-war development of the Western 
economics has been witness to a displacement of the original 
conflict between capital and labor with a persistent tug-of-war 
between countries with high public debt, on the one hand, and 
financial markets, on the other. Countries that struggle to 
restore private credit to their damaged economies have to 
increase their public debt. In order to succeed at that, they 
depend on a favorable response from those institJUtions that 
36. See, e.g., Wolfgang Strccck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW LEFT 
REVIEW 5 (2011 ). 
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actually benefit from their largesse. Evidently, the locus of 
control shifts from politics to the economy. The consequences 
are disheartening. In order to come out with a sustainable 
credit score, countries need to implement austerity programs 
that signal credibility to credit markets. Countries seem to have 
no choice. The affected populations either react with revolt or 
realize that there is nothing left for politics to decide and turn 
away from democracy. It begins to dawn upon them that the 
real constraints on governance are economic. They arc intrinsic 
to fostering the public weal (p. 23, citations omitted). 
683 
What emerges is what Somek identifies as "authoritarian 
liberalism" (p. 23). Nation-states are subjugated to financial 
markets. States, and their economies, are governed not as 
democracies but run like businesses. Everything is economic: it's 
all about "micro-management" (p. 24). 
Streeck maintains that, following the Second World War, 
capitalism permitted politics to enter in economic planning. By 
the 1970s, laissez-faire capitalism was dead, having been replaced 
by "some political control of the economic system" (p. 239). 
Capital then pulled out of the earlier post-war settlement, owing 
to rising inflation. To combat capital flight, states reduced wages 
and tolerated high unemployment. The perennial conflict 
between capitalism and democracy then moved into the forum of 
electoral politics. Governments responded to rising wages and the 
threat of economic slump by deregulating the financial sector. 
This gave birth to what Crouch calls "Privatised Keynesianism,"37 
epitomized, Somek claims, "by the policies of the Clinton years" 
(p. 240). With the disappearance of wage increases and 
increasingly austere social policy, risky credit filled the void with 
"[i]ndividual private debt replac[ing] public debt" (p. 240). Then, 
in 2008, the U.S. housing bubble burst, forcing the government to 
rescue the banks. As mentioned, ironically, governments find 
themselves beholden to the same institutions which benefitted 
from their assistance. It gets worse. Somek summarizes the 
situation: "International institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund, or supranational bodies, such as the Commission 
and the European Central Bank, demand these programs. The 
spoils and benefits of the banking system are now financed 
through pension cuts and the phasing out of entitlements" (p. 
240). 
37. See Colin Crouch, Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime, 
11 13RITISH J. POL. & INTERN'L REL. 3X2, 3X7-XX (2009). 
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Somek describes the "tug of war" between governments and 
finance thus: 
It is important to realize that the tug-of-war between 
governments and haute finance is merely a symptom. 
Generally, symptoms are unsuccessful attempts at problem 
solving. An inflammation, for example, is a defense 
mechanism, and in this respect it is beneficial; but it is also 
painful and can give rise to additional ailments. The underlying 
problem, of which the domination of states by financial 
markets is the symptom, is the conflict between the interests of 
capital, on the one hand, and the interest of the great mass of 
people who until a few decades ago had been able to usc 
democracy in order to assert their interests politically. The pre-
eminence of finance vis-a-vis politics is merely a displaced 
manner in which the latter experience their subordination to 
the former (p. 240). 
This leaves nation-states answerable to two different sorts of 
"people." The first are their own citizens and the second are a 
group Streeck calls "market people." Market people are a private 
polity but they have all the power. They vote with their feet and 
their money. "They vote through the buying or selling of 
securities, through investment in a local business project or 
through accepting well-paid employment" (p. 241). It is the fate 
of the polity- "ordinary folks"- to cling to their withering "social 
rights, guaranteed on the basis of national constitutional 
arrangements" (p. 241 ). The only way to ameliorate this situation 
is for "constitutionalism ... to return to a way of thinking from 
which it had once emerged" (p. 241 ). 
There are two questions to ask about this diagnosis of the 
present situation in constitutional law (Constitutionalism 3.0). 
The first regards the plausibility of Streeck's analysis, on which 
Somek so heavily relies. Second, even if Streeck is correct in his 
diagnosis of the post-war realignment of relations between labor 
and capital, does this account for the present state of 
constitutionalism? 
Streeck's thesis begins with the claim that the 2008 financial 
crisis was not a "one off" event. Rather, he n1aintains, "the 
present crisis can only be fully understood in terms of the ongoing, 
inherently conflictual transformation of the sociall formation we 
call 'democratic capitalism'."3x This is not the place to debate the 
macroeconomic aspects of Streeck's thesis. I will, however, 
3X. Strccck, supra note 36, at 5. 
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observe that both in the hands of Streeck and Somek, the thesis 
starts to lose plausibility once one moves beyond the borders of 
Continental Europe. 
First, consider the Nordic countries. 19 Does the IMF tell 
Norway what to do with its oil riches? Is the Swedish welfare state 
not thriving? 40 And what of unemployment in Denmark and 
Finland? None of these economies seems to be under the control 
of the IMF, the ECB, or anyone else. Their welfare states are 
doing just fine. They do not confirm Streeck's thesis. 
Outside of Europe, one finds more than a few 
counterexamples to Streeck's thesis. The Canadian bankinR 
system felt little of the ill effects of the Lehman meltdown. 1 
India's economy is booming, as is China's. The United States 
saved the banks and made billions in the process. 42 Australia, 
Rus~ia, Mexico, Korea an? J ~pan all seem to fall outside the 
confines of Streeck's narrative. · 
Does Streeck explain what is going on in the Eurozone? Up 
to a point, yes. But, as Ulrich Beck has pointed out, 44 the principal 
ideologue in setting austerity policy is Germany. As of the time of 
this writing, the new Greek government is withering in its attempt 
to throw off the yoke of austerity. It isn't only bond yields that are 
putting pressure on the Greeks: it is Berlin. The reasons are 
ideological and not fiscal. Merkel and Schauble are not pressing 
3lJ. Tht.: t.:vidt.:nct.: is found in acct.:ssible form in an issue of The Hconomist devoted to 
the Nordic countries. See The Next Supermodel, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.cconomist.com/ncws/lcadcrs/21571136-politicians-both-right-and-lcft-could-
lcarn-nordic-countrics-ncxt-supcrmodcl. 
40. For informed discussion, sec SVEN STEINMO, TilE EVOUITION OF MODERN 
STATES: SWEDEN, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES (2010). 
41. See David Cho, U.S. Take If It Sells Its Citi Stake To Settle Cost of Bailout: $8 
Billion, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contcnt/articlc/201 0/03/26/ AR20 1 0032604lJ3X.html. 
42. The U.S. government banked 15 billion dollars on its bailout stake in Citicorp. 
See Stephen Gandcl, Government Banks $15 Billion on Citigroup Bailout, FORTUNE (Sept. 
10, 2013), http://fortunc.com/2013/0l)/l 0/govcrnmcnt-banks-15-billion-on-citigroup-bail 
out/. 
43. At least two of the states mentioned in this paragraph arc controversial: China 
and Russia. The obvious objection is that neither is "democratic." There is an obvious 
sense in which this is true. But I think Fukuyama had it right when ht.: said that we have 
st.:cn "the end of history" wht.:n it comes to the triumph of dt.:mocracy over fascism and 
communism. Going forward, there is no alternative. Sec Frands Fukuyama. The End of 
1/istory?, THE NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1l)XlJ. Travel and t.:dut.:ation arc two mdrics for 
democracy. In this regard, it is interesting to nott.: the great expansion in the numbt.:r of 
students from Russia and t.:spccially China travt.:lling to the U.S. and the U.K. for university 
and post-graduate education. See 5pecial Report- Universities: "Excellence v lc'quity," THE 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.t.:conomist.com/ncws/special-rcport/21646l)X5-
amt.:rican-modcl-highcr-t.:ducation-spreading-it-good-producing-cxccllcncc. 
44. See ULRICH BECK, GERMAN EUROPE (2013). 
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their case because they are the puppets of global capital. They are 
doing it because they think it is deontologically required. That's 
ideology, not finance. 
What about the connection between transnational regulators 
and global finance? Here the link seems even rnore tenuous. 
Somek rails against the Basel Committee, the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the World Health Organization and 
the IMF because they are "relatively immune to political 
challenge and operate on the basis of their own functional 
specifications and institutional culture" (p. 274). For Somek, the 
only form of legitimacy for organizations dealing with 
transnational or global challenges is democracy. A.s he correctly 
states, the claim of such organizations "is based on the generation 
and implementation of expertise" (p. 274). But Somek rejects 
expertise as a ground of authority or legitimacy. 45 He seems to 
prefer his authority and legitimacy the old-fashioned way: 
through democratic participation in a nation-state. That is why he 
never wavers in his belief that the nation-state is central to the 
future of constitutionalism. 
Somek's argument depends a great deal on the strength of 
Streeck's analysis. As I have suggested, Streeck's thesis faces 
some strong explanatory headwinds as the Northern part of 
continental Europe does not confirm his thesis. Additionally, 
there are just too many states in the world today that do not fit 
the narrative. 
Ironically, if Somek is correct about the state of world affairs, 
then there is no way to rehabilitate nation-state democracies to 
the extent that they can actually deal with the issues he discusses. 
The irony is that he must either give up constitutionalism or the 
nation-state (the two things he likes most), and embrace either of 
the things he disdains, the wishful thinking of global 
constitutionalism or the impotency of nation-state 
constitutionalism. 
45. Somek considers and rejects Joseph Raz's Service Conception of Authority. He 
writes: 
The application of this 'service conception' of authority presuppo~;es not only that 
people would find it easy to distinguish between what they confidently know 
themselves and what is better for them to have known hy others, hut also that the 
meaning and scope of the conception could he easily ascertained. The roughly 40 
densely argued pages that Raz recently wrote elaborating the conception must 
make this appear doubtful (p. 2XO, citation omitted). 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 687 
CONCLUSION 
My cnticisms notwithstanding, this is an engaging and 
important book. Somek's diagnosis of the current state of 
constitutional theorizing is at once compelling and provocative. 
What is truly remarkable about this book is the way Somek links 
debates about constitutionalism to global forces in a way no one 
else does. This is an extraordinary achievement. Even if one 
disagrees with the thesis, the arguments must be taken seriously. 
No one else in constitutional or legal theory is writing anything 
like this. Quite simply, this is a book no one can ignore. 
